PENSIONS AND RETIREMENT: EVIDENCE FROM
UNION ARMY VETERANS* I investigate the factors that fostered rising retirement rates prior to social security and most private-sector pensions by estimating the income effect of the first major pension program in the United Sates, that covering Union Army veterans. The elasticity of nonparticipation with respect to Union Army pension income was 0.73. The findings suggest that secularly rising income explains a substantial part of increased retirement rates. Comparisons with elasticities of nonparticipation with respect to social security income suggest that the elasticity of labor force nonparticipation may have decreased with time, perhaps because of the increasing attractiveness of leisure.
Increasing numbers of men have permanently abandoned the labor force at ever younger ages during the twentieth century. In 1880 78 percent of men 65 years of age or older were in the labor force and in 1900 65 percent, whereas in 1930 the figure had dropped to 58 percent. But by 1980 the figure was less than 25 percent [Moen 1987 ; cf. Ransom and Sutch 19861. Among men aged 55-64 and 45-64, labor force participation rates were 86 and 90 percent at the turn of the century, but had fallen to 71 percent and 82 percent, respectively, by 1980 [Durand 1948 granted by the Revenue Act of 1942 contributed to rising retirement rates [Burkhauser 1979; Kotlikoff and Wise, 1985; Stock and Wise 19901 . States began to establish old-age pensions in 1993.2 The Social Security old-age insurance and old-age assistance programs were instituted in 1935 and grew steadily after 1950. In 1956 Social Security Disability Insurance was established for older, permanently disabled workers. By 1960 all workers, regardless of age, and their dependents were eligible for Social Security disability benefit^.^ Explanations for the decline prior to the establishment of Social Security have focused on the shift of production from the home to the factory and from agriculture to manufacturing [Smelser 1959; Moen 19871 ; and changes in societal and individual attitudes toward work at older ages, manifested by the imposition of mandatory retirement [Graebner 1980; Achenbaum 19781 . Finally, a possible reason for the decline in labor force participation observed from the turn of the century to the present is an increased demand for leisure arising from higher incomes and from the growth of the entertainment and tourism industries.
Most research on the subject has used cross-sectional data for the post-1960s, but the applicability of cross-sectional estimates to periods outside the sample range is questionable. Male retirement rates increased since 1880, and 70 percent of the decline occurred before 1960. Retirement rates were already high by 1960, and thus only large benefit increases could have enticed those remaining in the labor force to have withdrawn. To understand why retirement rates increased prior to 1960 and before the advent of most public and private pensions, I investigate the determinants of work levels in 1900 among white Union Army veterans receiving Union Army pensions.
The Union Army pension was available to veterans regardless of their labor force participation status. The receipt or level of the pension did not depend on current income or upon past wages. Rather, the generosity of Union Army pensions was determined by the pensioner's health. Because the amount received also depended on whether the veteran could trace his disability to the war and not just the seriousness of the infirmity, I can disentangle the effect of pensions on labor supply from that of health. Therefore, Union Army pensions can be used to estimate a pure income effect on labor supply. My findings thus reveal the effect of income growth on retirement and so bear on income effects arising from the Social Security retirement and disability programs.
The Union Army records reveal the experiences of the old at a time when aging was just emerging as a public issue. The first public commission on aging and the first major survey of the economic conditions of the aged were instituted in Massachusetts around 1910 [Fischer 19771 . Because a large percentage of the elderly population received a Union Army pension, the records allow us to examine the impact on retirement patterns of the first major pension program in the United States prior to most private pensions and Social S e~u r i t y .~
CIVILWARPENSIONS RECORDS AND UNION
The scope of the pension program in 1900, run for the benefit of Union veterans and their dependent children and widows, was enormous. Benefits consumed almost 30 percent of the federal budget Winovskis 19901, and veterans lobbied vociferously for high tariffs to continue feeding the federal surplus [Glasson 1918a, pp. 2 18-19] . Even though Confederates were ineligible and immigration increased the population, a large percentage of the population was collecting benefits. Among all white males, 35 percent of those aged 55-59 were on the pension rolls, 21 percent of those aged 60-64,14 percent of those aged 65-69, and 9 percent of those 70 or older. The annual value of the average veteran pension was $135, or 53 percent of the annual income of farm laborers, 36 percent of the income of nonfarm laborers, 20 percent of the income of carpenters, blacksmiths, or salesmen, and 12 percent of the annual income of landlords or merchant^.^ The basic system of pension laws, known as the General Law pension system, was established in 1862 by the United States Congress and provided pensions to both regular and volunteer recruits who were disabled as a direct result of military ~ervice.~ The dollar amount received depended upon degree of disability, where disability was determined by the applicant's capacity to 4. Only twelve private pension plans existed in 1900. These plans were small and could be withdrawn at the discretion of the company. The federal government had no regular retirement or pension system for its employees until 1920 [Fischer 1977; Haber 19831. 5. Imputations for annual incomes are given in Table A .l in Preston and Haines [1991, pp. 212-201 . For older men the pension represented an even greater proportion of earnings because of the sharp decline in the age-earnings profile.
6. See Glasson [1918a] for a history of the Union Army pension program.
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QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS perform manual labor. Under later reinterpretations the total disability standard soon meant incapacity to perform even lighter types of manual labor. In fact, men judged disabled continued to labor in physically demanding, manual occupations. Inability to perform manual labor remained the standard in this and all subsequent laws, regardless of the wealth of the individual or his ability to earn a living by other than manual means. Withdrawal from the labor force was not a necessary prerequisite for the receipt of a pension. If the claimant had lesser disabilities, then he received an amount proportionate to his disabilities. Application was through a pension attorney and the degree of disability was determined by a board of three local doctors employed by the Pension Bureau and following guidelines established by the B~r e a u .~ The Act of June 27,1890, marked the beginning of a universal disability and old-age pension program for Union veterans. The new law, according to the veterans' lobby, would "place upon the rolls all survivors of the war whose conditions of health are not practically perfe~t."~ In fact, within a year of the act's passage, the number of pensioners on the rolls more than doubled. Any disability now entitled a veteran to a pension. However, an applicant who could trace his disability to wartime service received substantially more for the same disability than his counterpart who could not. By 1900, the year the effects of pensions on labor force participation are studied, men who could not claim a disability of service origin received from $6 to $12 per month or from 19 to 38 percent of the monthly income of a laborer, while men who could claim a war-related disability generally received a pension ranging from $6 to $35 per month or up to 109 percent of the monthly income of a laborer. Although few men were eligible, pensions for war-related disabilities could be up to $100 per month, close to one third of the yearly income of a l a b~r e r .~ 7. In the sample used in this research, demographic and occupational characteristics did not predict pension amount. Neither did the lawyer through whom the veteran applied. For 80 men qualitative information is available that allows me to identify the poor, the middle class, and the wealthy. There was no relation between income category and pension amount. Similarly, the ratings of the surgeons did not depend upon the lawyer or upon income category. These findings suggest that fraud is not biasing mv results. Glasson [1918bl. 9. In 1900 the pensioner who could trace his disability to the war was entitled to $30 for incapacity to perform any manual labor, $24 for a disability equivalent to the loss of a hand or foot, $17 for the loss of one eve. and $6 to $10 for a single hernia. His counterpart who could not trace his disibibiiity to the w& received $i2, $10, $6, and $6 for each respective ailment. Veterans who could trace their disabilities to the war received, by Congressional decree, up to $100 for loss of both hands, feet, or eyes. However, a veteran blinded in an industrial accident received at 301 PENSIONS AND RETIREMENT Even though old age was not recognized by statute law as sufficient cause to qualify for a pension until 1907, the Pension Bureau instructed the examining surgeons in 1890 to grant a minimum pension to all men at least 65 years of age, unless they were unusually vigorous. Men aged at least 75 years were entitled to an even larger pension. After 1900 the Bureau's old-age provisions grew still more generous. But if the applicant could claim a specific disability, then he might be entitled to a pension larger than that granted for age alone. Therefore, controlling for both health and age, I can identify the effect of pension income on labor supply.
Copious records were generated by the Union Army pension program. Pension applications included rejections, retrospective information, and all applications for increases. Applications for increases could be filed at any time. In the sample studied here, each veteran filed an average of twelve prior to 1900. For every twelve, about two were rejected, most commonly on the grounds that the alleged disabilities were unrelated to the war.1°
The Union Army records used in this research represent a 6 percent sample of a larger project that is still underway (see Fogel et al. [19911 for details) and consist of men in twenty companies linked from their army records to their pension records, including the successive medical reports of the examining surgeons of the Pension Bureau, and to the 1900 census. The twenty companies are predominantly from Ohio and New York state, but the Civil War cohort in these states did not differ in observable characteristics, such as home ownership, marital status, literacy, occupational distribution, foreign-birth, and age from other Northern states.ll Seven hundred and twelve men were linked to the 1900 census out of 1036 men at risk to be found. Among the information that the 1900 census provides is occupation. Virtually all men found in the 1900 census were on the pension rolls by 1900.12 An examining surgeons' report is available for 88 percent of these men, and these provide many health variables. Wages, incomes, and wealth are not explicitly reported, but there is occupational information that most $12. (Men with multiple ailments did not receive a pension amount equal to the sum of the amount that would be received by men with a single disability. Instead, they received an amount that reflected their total disability.)
10. In the sample 24 percent of all men for whom causes of rejection are known were rejected for this reason.
11. Calculated from the 1900 Public Use Sample [Preston and Higgs 19831. 12. This is in part because men who were rejected would have a pension record.
makes it possible to estimate the income categories into which pension applicants belonged. The analysis presented in this paper is based on the sample of 696 noninstitutionalized men found in the 1900 census. Information on pension amount is not available for 170 men even though these men were collecting pensions. Because tests indicated that the absence of pension information is determined by random factors, these men were excluded from the analysis. The sample is representative of the northern population in terms of mortality and wealth.13 Men were classified as (1) farmers, (2) professionals or proprietors, (3) artisans, and (4) semiskilled or unskilled laborers, including farm laborers, on the basis of their 1900 occupation, if in the labor force, or, if retired, on the basis of their previous occupation as given in the pension records.14 Retired men whose occupation was unknown were assigned to an occupational class on the basis of their occupation at enlistment and their probability of switching occupational category given their individual characteristics. Their ages ranged from 50 to 81.
A man is considered to be retired in this analysis if the census enumerator specifically stated that he was "retired" or had "no occupation," or if he left the occupational field empty. The labor force experience of Union Army veterans can be compared with the labor force experience of the general population by contrasting veterans' retirement rates with those of a random sample of men aged 50-81 drawn from the public use sample of the 1900 Census [Preston and Higgs 19831 . Table I compares retirement rates by age group among men in the veteran sample with the random sample. Retirement rates for veterans are higher at all ages. Table I contains the suggestion that retirement rates were higher for veterans because of the Union Army pension. But morbidity rates may have been higher for veterans and poor health, not the pension, may have been the driving factor. The impact of pensions apart from health can be determined by comparing 13. Life tables were constructed for the men found in the 1900 Census and compared with mortality schedules constructed for states that kept death registration records. The two life tables are similar. Also, the distribution of causes of death of veterans who died circa 1910 and were in the pension records is not significantly different from the distribution of causes of death reported by the death registration states. Recruits' households were neither disproportionately rich nor poor in 1860 [Fogel 1993; Fogel et al. 19911 and using height as a proxy for wealth, I find that wealth does not predict war survivorship.
14. The census enumerators were asked to record an individual's primary occupation. In the few cases where two occupations were given, the first occupation was taken. Neither past nor current occupation is known for 51 men in the sample. retirement rates of veterans with similar health status but different pension levels.
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The pension amount that a veteran received depended on his success in proving that his disability was related to wartime service. Because many veterans who were in ill health did not receive a large pension, it is possible to identify an income effect from pensions. Among those whose health status is known, 57 percent could not claim that their disabilities were of service origin.l5
The ratings of the examining surgeons were used to construct health variables. The surgeons rated each specific disability, and I added the ratings to create an index that was then used to construct dummies for health status. The Pension Bureau specified how a disability, such as anchylosis of the wrist, should be rated. The examining surgeons then had to decide, for example, if the veteran's heart condition was equivalent to anchylosis of the wrist in performing manual labor. If it was, then it received the same rating. Almost all men in the sample for whom either the complaint, the reason for the ruling, or surgeons' ratings are known claimed some kind of disability.
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Men with war-related disabilities, and therefore men eligible for a large pension, were not a random sample. Compared with men whose disabilities were not service related, men who claimed a disability of service-related origin were more likely to have been discharged for disability, to have been prisoners of war, and to have been volunteers. They were also more likely to be farmers and less likely to be professionals and proprietors. Interestingly, there is no significant difference in the percentage claiming injury or gunshot wounds, but men without service-related disabilities were more likely to claim rheumatism, gastrointestinal disorders other than diarrhea, respiratory disorders, hernias, and symptoms and illdefined conditions that could not be classified. Men who could trace their disabilities to the war entered the rolls earlier, were judged by the surgeons to be in worse health, and were less likely to live out their expected life span.
Even though men who could trace their disability to the war were in worse health, on average, than those who could not, an income effect from pensions can still be identified provided that I can control for the limiting health factor that won men their pension. In fact, holding health status constant, pension amounts are higher among men who could trace their disability to the war than among men who could not (see Table 11 ). Among all men the median pension amount was $12, and among men whose disabilities resulted from their wartime service, and who were rated as being very disabled, 84 percent were receiving more than $12 per month. All men whose disabilities did not result from wartime service were collecting $12 a month or less. Among all men on the rolls under either cause, 56 percent of the very disabled were receiving pensions of over $12, and 42 percent pensions of $12 or less.
Among men less than 70 years of age, attachment to the labor force was lower for those receiving higher pensions and for those in poor health (Table III) .16 Receipt of a large pension and disability were correlated. Table IV shows retirement rates by health category and by pension amount among men less than 70 years of age. Retirement rates were higher at higher pension amounts among the mildly, fairly, and very disabled, but not significantly so. But, because men with war-related disabilities were employed in different occupations and differed in terms of marital and head of household status, I need to control for other characteristics.
The impact of Union Army pensions on retirement among men aged 50-81 is estimated by a probit in which the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the veteran was retired and zero otherwise.17 The control variables are derived from the 1900 census, which provides information on occupation and labor force participation, the pension and military service records, and the reports of the examining surgeons. Individuals are assumed to face a discrete choice between retirement and labor force participation. The well-being experienced in each option is determined by the income flows associated with each option, the utility of time spent in leisure, the stigma costs of not working, and other sources of 16. The sample was limited to those men less than 70 because few men were over age 70 and because retirement rates rise with age.
17. The findings remain unchanged when a logit is used. The health proxies used in estimation are whether the veteran was discharged for disability and dummies for good, fair, and poor health based upon the ratings of the examining surgeons. The use of such broad health categories raises the possibility that health has been inadequately controlled for and that a higher pension amount may be reflecting some of the effects of health. It is possible to test whether there is health information in pension amount in addition to that in the health dummies. If there is no additional health information in pension amount, then the residuals from a prediction of pension amount on the health dummies, whether the disability was traceable to the war, and age should not predict subsequent mortality. They do not.
Several proxies for earnings and wealth are available. I use past occupation as a proxy for the opportunity cost of not working. Past occupation may be a poor proxy for opportunity cost if the ill are no longer able to work in their usual occupation. For these men the opportunity cost of retirement is underestimated. Therefore, the impact of pensions may be overestimated. Other indicators of lower earnings are illiteracy and foreign birth. Marital status may also be measuring earnings if employers favor married men or if married men were more skilled. In 1900 married males in manufacturing earned 17 percent more than unmarried males, controlling for the observable characteristics of workers and their jobs [Goldin 1990 [Goldin , p. 1021 . Among home owners in cities, letting out rooms to boarders increases family income, but may be symptomatic of economic difficulties [Modell and Hareven 19731 . The hiring of a servant is an indicator of affluence. Home ownership meant that the person had wealth, because a substantial down payment, generally equal to half of the value of the purchased property, was required [Haines and Goodman 19921.18 Higher unemployment in the veteran's current state may induce more retirement.lg
The probit results are presented in Table V . A single linear term in age is included because tests reveal that in 1900 the probability of retirement did not increase sharply at a specific age.20 Tests also revealed that pension amount should be included as a 18. However, because property was one of primary modes of saving, men who had retired might already have liquidated their property.
19. Margo [I9931 finds that the long-term unemployed soon retired. The statewide unemployment numbers are from Table A.13 in Keyssar [1986, pp. 340-411. 20. The coefficients on a spline in age are insignificant and the use of a spline leaves the regression results unchanged. Similarly, the use of a quadratic term in age does not affect the results. indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from 0 at least at the 10 percent, the 5 percent, and the 1 percent level, respectively. a P l a= p(l1n)l: +(x'p), where 41is the standard normal density, and is in probability units.
linear term.21 The effect on the probability of retirement of a unit change in one of the independent variables is given by the partial derivative of the probability function P with respect to that independent variable. Thus, a $10 increase in monthly pension income raises the retirement probability by 0.09.22 Coefficients on 21. The coefficients on a spline in pension amount are insigificant. Coefficients on third-and fourth-order polynomials in age are also insi 22. The values of d P / h were calculated as P(l/n)~$x"$~'where +( ) is a standard normal density function, P is the probit coefficient, and n is the number of observations.
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interactions of pension amount with poor health and dummies for older ages and an above average unemployment rate are small and insignificant.
As previously noted, those with higher pensions may be less healthy, but their poorer health may be unobservable. Furthermore, although pensions were awarded regardless of participation status, nonparticipation may have been viewed by employees of the Pension Bureau as evidence of inability to perform manual labor. Thus, because of dependence on unobservable retirement determinants, pension status is potentially endogenous. Recall that the ability to establish that a disability was related to wartime service depended on the recruit's record of military service and the prevailing medical theories. The ability to establish whether a disability was traceable to wartime service predicts pension amount and is arguably not related to unobserved retirement determinants conditional on measured health status. Although the war-disabled entered the pension rolls eight years earlier than those not war-disabled, the war-disabled were not necessarily disabled earlier in life and therefore did not necessarily have worse work histories and lower opportunity costs to not working. Whether a recruit could trace his disability to the war does not predict downward mobility from occupation at enlistment to occupation in 1900.Furthermore, the fraction of men who were property owners does not vary by ability to establish whether a disability was war-related. Whether or not a recruit could trace his disability to the war is therefore used as an instrumental variable.
A probit model with an endogenous explanatory variable can be estimated using two-stage conditional maximum likelihood estimation (see Rivers and Vuong [1988] ). This approach yields consistent estimates of pension amount on retirement under the assumption that the indicator variable for whether or not a recruit can trace his disability to the war is a legitimate instrument. The model is composed of a structural equation that is of primary interest and a reduced-form equation for the endogenous variable:
I: is not observed; only the dummy variable, Ii = 1 if retired and zero otherwise, is. Pi is pension amount. ZIi is a vector of exogenous variables and is a subset of Zi, which also contains the instrumental variables excluded from the equation of primary interest. The normally distributed error terms are represented by ui and Vi. The 310 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS two-stage conditional maximum likelihood estimation approach can be easily carried out with standard regression and probit programs. In the first stage, pension amount is regressed on the exogenous variables (Zli)and a dummy equal to one if the recruit could trace his disability to the war. In the second stage, a probit is estimated using pension amount, the exogenous variables, and the residuals from the first step as explanatory variables. Rivers and Vuong [I9881 present formulas for the standard errors.23 A convenient feature of this estimation procedure is that a Hausman test for exogeneity of pension amount is whether the coefficient on the residuals is equal to zero, where the test is estimated using the uncorrected standard errors. In fact, the hypothesis that the coefficient on the residuals is not equal to zero can only be rejected at the 85 percent level of significance, suggesting that endogeneity is not a problem.
Table VI compares probit estimates with those from a twostage conditional maximum likelihood procedure among the 485 men for whom information on whether the disability is traceable to the war is available.24 The first-stage estimates are also presented. The change in the coefficient on pension amount is small, with the estimated mean effect of a dollar increase in monthly pension amount on the retirement probability rising from 0.0092 when a probit is estimated to 0.0101 when two-stage conditional maximum likelihood estimation is used. As in the simple probit, coefficients on interactions of pension amount with other variables are small and insignificant.
Another possible source of bias is that from sample selection bias. If pensions affected survivorship, then the men surviving to 1900 will be a selected sample and the coefficient on pensions will be biased.25 I tested whether pension amount affects life expectancy using a proportional hazards model where the dependent variable was the number of years lived after 1900. Controlling for health, pension amount did not affect the probability of mortality. However, if duration of pension recipiency, not pension amount, matters for length of life, then the coefficient on pensions will be 23. When the coefficient on the residuals in the second stage is equal to zero, the standard errors are the usual probit standard errors. There was little difference between the corrected and uncorrected second-stage standard errors.
24. Men for whom information on whether their disabilities could be traced to the war is unavailable do not differ in observable characteristics from men for whom this information is available.
25. The bias could go either way. Notes. The first stage is a regression of pension amount on the exogenous variables and whether the disability was traceable to the war. The second stage is a prohit with the exogenous variables, pension amount, and the first-stage residuals as explanatory variables. The standard errors have been corrected. The symbols *, t,and $ indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at least at the 10percent, the 5 percent, and the 1 percent level, respectively. aP/ax = p(l/n)L +(xrP), where + i s the standard normal density, and is in probability units. Notes. Retirement rates assuming a pension elimination were calculated using the coefficients in Table V . The random sample was drawn from the public use sample of the 1900 Census [Preston and Higgs 19831 . The restrided random sample was limited to men either who were born in a Union state or who, if foreign-born, immigrated prior to the Civil War. The samples contain both veterans and nonveterans and have been reweighted to have the same age distribution as the veteran sample. Estimates of the fraction collecting Union Army pensions were used to calculate retirement rates under a pension elimination.
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biased. But controlling for health, date of entry is not a significant predictor of mortality.
Elasticities of labor force nonparticipation with respect to pension income can be calculated from mean derivatives and retirement probabilities. In the probit specification in Table V and at the pension mean of $12.90, the elasticity is 0.73 (=(0.0090)(12.9/ 0.1589)). (The elasticity is the same in the probit specification in Table VI . Using two-stage conditional maximum likelihood estimation, the elasticity of labor force nonparticipation with respect to pension income rises to 0.80 (=(0.0101)(12.9/0.1625).) Evaluated one-half standard deviation below the pension mean and one-half standard deviation above, the elasticities are 0.53 (=(0.0076)(9.0/ 0.1289)) and 0.88 (=(0.0104)(16.8/0.1990)), respectively. Hence, the larger the pension income, the larger the elasticity. Table VII shows the impact of the elimination of Union Army pensions on retirement rates. Retirement rates in the veteran sample and in the general population, which contains veterans collecting Union Army pensions,
The increase in the ratio of 26. Among the white male population 15 percent of those aged 50-59 were collecting a Union Army pension, 18percent of those 60-69, and 9 percent of those 70-81. Among the white male population either born in a Union state, or if foreign-born, who immigrated prior to the Civil War, 28percent of those aged 50-59 were collecting a Union Army pension, 33 percent of those 60-69, and 22 percent of those 70-81 (calculated from Table 2 .1 in Costa [I9931 and Preston and Higgs general population to veteran sample retirement rates when pensions are eliminated suggests that much of the difference in the retirement rates between veterans and the general population is due to pensions.
Variation in pension amount by whether a recruit was able to trace his disability to the war has enabled me to separate the impact of pensions from that of health. Another source of variation in the Union Army pension program was disparate treatment by type of veteran. Confederates were ineligible. Information on retirement rates among Union Army and Confederate veterans is available from the 1910 Public Use Sample [Preston 19891 . One of the questions asked in the 1910 Census was whether the respondent was a veteran, and, if so, whether a Union or Confederate veteran. In 1910 Union pensioners were collecting an average pension of $171.90 per year, and about 90 percent of all Union veterans were collecting a pension. Although some Confederate states provided pensions, the average pension amount was just $47.24 per year, and fewer than 30 percent of all Confederate veterans were collecting a pension.27 Because it was mainly the "northern-born," that is, men born in a Union state, who fought for the Union, while the "southern-born," that is, men born in a Confederate state, fought for the Confederacy, when retirement rates from a northern-born sample are compared with those from a southern-born sample, then the difference in retirement rates should consist of two components. The first will be the component due to observable differences, such as region of residence or fraction of veterans in the population. The second component should be due to differences in participation behavior. Union Army pensions will lead to differences in the participation functions. So [19831) . Retirement rates among nonveterans are calculated from R, = RJfraction veterans) + R,,(fraction nonveterans), where Rg is the retirement rate of the general population, R, that of veterans, and R,, that of nonveterans. Assuming that a pension elimination only affects veteran retirement rates, new retirement rates for the veteran population can be estimated.
27. Glasson [1918a gives the number of Civil War veterans on the pension rolls in 1910. Because of undernumeration of veterans in the 1910 census, the total number of Union Army veterans is estimated from a life table and is from Series Y 957-970 in U. S. Bureau of the Census [1975, p. 11451 . Assuming that undernumeration of veterans did not vary among Union and Confederate veterans, the number of Confederate veterans can be calculated from the 1910 public use sample. [Preston 19891 . There were a few Confederate veterans in the northern-born sample and a few Union veterans in the southern-born sample. When dummies are included for these men, the coefficient on Confederate veteran in the Union sample is insignificant, and that on Union veteran in the southern-born sample significant. The omitted dummy is residence in the East. The symbols *, t, and $ indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at least at the 10 percent, the 5 percent, and the 1percent level, respectively. aLlax = P l l n Z L ( l -L), where P is the vector of estimated coefficients, L is the logistic distribution, and dLl& is in probability units. might other variables. For example, the northern-born who lived in the south may have differed in unobservable retirement determinants. Disability levels do not lead to differences in participation behavior because it is assumed that disability levels were the same across both Union and Confederate veterans.28 Table VIII contrasts the northern-and southern-born participation functions among men aged 65-89 in 1910. The foreign-born are excluded. In both samples a small fraction of men served for the 28. Although disability levels for Confederate veterans are unavailable, young men in the South were aImost three times as likely to die during the Civil War as young northern men [Vinovskis 19901 , suggesting that disability rates were probably higher in the South. If this is so, then the size of the residual component will be underestimated.
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opposing side and are classified as n o n v e t e r a n~.~~ The primary difference in the participation functions arises from veteran status. In the southern-born sample Confederate veteran status is not a significant predictor of retirement. In the northern-born sample Union Army veteran status is, suggesting that Union pensions led to higher retirement rates among veterans.
The northern-born participation function is used to estimate whether the difference in participation rates between the northernborn and southern-born sample is largely due to differences in observable characteristics or in participation behavior. More formally, let Rnbe the probability of retirement among the northernborn, Rs the probability among the southern-born, and Xn and Xs the vectors of northern-born and southern-born characteristics. Then, where the first term is predicted using the northern-born participation equation for both samples and the second term is the residual component due to differences in participation behavior between northern-born and southern-born using the southern-born sample. The actual difference in retirement rates is 0.0747. Using the northern-born participation equation for both samples yields a value of -0.007 for the first term, suggesting that differences in participation behavior and thus pensions account for most of the difference in retirement rates between the southern-and northernborn.
Union Army pensions, I have demonstrated, exerted a large impact on male labor force participation rates. The elasticity of labor force nonparticipation with respect to pension income was 0.73. The majority of recent studies finds a smaller impact on labor force participation rates of either assets or Social Security retirement and disability payments [Bound 1989; Bound and Waidmann 1992; Haveman and Wolfe 1984a, 198413; Hausman and Wise 1985; Krueger and Pischke 19921 . Elasticities of labor force nonparticipa-29. If these men are classified as either Confederate veterans in the northernborn sample or Union Army veterans in the southern-born sample, then the coefficients in Table VIII do not change. Although no strong conclusions can be drawn from such a small fraction of men in either category, Union Army veterans in the southern-born sample were significantly more likely to be out of the labor force, whereas Confederate veterans in the northern-born sample were not. tion with respect to assets in these studies are close to zero, and Bound [I9891 finds an elasticity of labor force nonparticipation with respect to Social Security disability of 0.16. Studies finding a sizable impact of Social Security payments on labor force nonparticipation are those of Hurd and Boskin [19841, Leonard [19791, and Parsons [19801. Parsons [I9801 calculates an elasticity with respect to Social Security disability of 0.63. These elasticities of nonparticipation may not be comparable with those calculated with respect to Union Army pensions. Assets are not necessarily exogenous, and Social Security payments will have both an income and a substitution effect. Furthermore, it is plausible to assume that the future stream of Social Security payments was predicted with greater accuracy by men in their working years than the future stream of Union Army payments.
Noncomparability could also arise because Union Army pensions were a large fraction of earnings compared with Social Security payments today. As previously noted, the average Union Army pension was 36 percent of the earnings of nonfarm laborers. The average Social Security payment today is 29 percent of the annual earnings of nonfarm laborers. Furthermore, Union Army pensions were the only available retirement program, whereas Social Security disability payments are 75 percent of all transfer payments.30 For comparability, the elasticity of labor force nonparticipation with respect to Union Army pension income should be compared with the elasticity of labor force nonparticipation with respect to total transfer income, not with respect to one program alone. If total transfer income were $12.90 per month, a program equivalent in scale and scope to Social Security Disability would pay $9.70 per month, or three-quarters of $12.90. Retirement income includes not only transfer income, but also private pensions. Disability payments represent 67 percent of the sum of transfer income and private pensions, or $8.60 out of $12.90 per month. The respective elasticities are 0.56 (=0.0078(9.7/0.1343)) and 0.51 (=0.0075(8.6/0.1259))-still high estimates.31
Estimates of the impact of Union Army pensions on retirement rates can be used to calculate the effect of a secular increase in income on the secular decline in male labor force participation rates, under the assumption that the elasticity of labor force 30. Estimated from Center for Human Resource Research [19851. 31. Of course, savings, wages of family members, and income from part-time work are now greater than in 1900. Therefore, a monthly transfer is likely to have a smaller effect at high than at low levels of retirement. nonparticipation with respect to pension income has remained constant since 1900. The retirement rate for men 65 years of age or older was 35 percent in 1900 35 percent in , 42 percent in 1930 35 percent in , 53 percent in 1950 35 percent in , and 75 percent in 1980 35 percent in [Moen 1987 . Per capita fixed reproducible tangible wealth rose by 33 percent between 1900 and 1930,57 percent between 1930 and 1950, and 79 percent between 1950 and 1980 .32 Therefore, an increase in income, holding wages constant, could explain 60 percent of the decline in labor force participation rates.
The evidence suggests that the elasticity of labor force nonparticipation with respect to income fell after 1900. Workers may now be less responsive to changes in transfer income because their choices are constrained by a retirement ethos or because leisure has become relatively more attractive. Graebner [I9801 argues that there was a national effort to glorify retirement in the 1950s and describes how retirement was aggressively marketed as a consumable commodity by corporations, labor unions, and insurance companies that were pension plan trustees. What is not known is whether the marketing of retirement was induced by increased retirement.
The marketing of retirement, however, was accompanied by the growth of leisure industries. Mass tourism and mass entertainment, such as films, television, golf, and spectator sports provides activities for the elderly at a low price. As the desirability of leisure increased, the elasticity of labor force nonparticipation with respect to pension income may have decreased. Once a sizable fraction of older men are retired, then unresponsiveness to pension payments may be the outcome of a "bandwagon" effect or of a desire to conform to societal expectations. The men remaining in the labor force may be those greatly attached to work and who could only be induced to leave the labor force by a very large sum of money. The findings thus suggest that as leisure continues to grow more attractive, changes in transfer policies alone may not be enough to induce large increases in labor force participation rates among the elderly. 
